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URING the survey period, the Texas appellate courts handed down
numerous decisions construing various common law rules of evi-
dence. Regrettably, very few cases during the survey period inter-
preted the Texas Rules of Evidence, presumably because the cases were tried
prior to the effective date of the rules.I
The cases of greatest significance arose from the following substantive ar-
eas: (1) the hearsay rule and its exceptions; (2) expert and lay opinion evi-
dence; (3) parol evidence; (4) judicial notice; (5) impeachment; (6) privileges;
(7) admissibility; (8) presumptions and inferences; (9) the dead man's stat-
ute; and (10) lack of probative evidence and insufficient evidence.
I. THE HEARSAY RULE AND ITS EXCEPTIONS
A. Identifying Hearsay
Whether a record or statement offered to prove its truth is hearsay is often
difficult to determine.2 " 'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by
the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted. '' 3 In Richardson v. Green4 the Texas
Supreme Court explained that out-of-court statements offered through a
videotaped recording rather than through the testimony of a witness were
hearsay when the statements were not made under oath and were not subject
to cross-examination. 5 In Pope v. Darcey6 the appellant complained of a list
of twenty-eight statements that were admitted without objection at trial,
contending that twenty-seven of the statements constituted hearsay.
Although appellant had failed to timely object to the statements, 7 the court
* J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Fulbright & Jaworski, Houston, Texas.
1. Adopted by the Supreme Court of Texas effective September 1, 1983.
2. The hearsay rule and its exceptions are comprehensively defined in TEX. R. EviD.
801-806. Additionally, TEX. R. EVID. 602 provides that "[a] witness may not testify to a
matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that he has personal knowl-
edge of the matter."
3. TEX. R. EvID. 801(d). "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or
by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court or by law." TEX. R. EVID. 802.
4. 677 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. 1984).
5. Id. at 502.
6. 667 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
7. "Inadmissible hearsay admitted without objection shall not be denied probative value
merely because it is hearsay." TEX. R. EvID. 802. This change is a significant one from prior
Texas practice, under which inadmissible hearsay would not support a judgment even when
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held that because none of the twenty-seven statements were admitted for
their truth or falsity, but rather simply to show that the statements were
made, the statements were not hearsay.8
B. Business Records
Texas Rule of Evidence 803(6) 9 governs the introduction of records of
regularly conducted activities and replaces the previous statutory exception
to the hearsay rule allowing the admission of business and other records.' 0
No business records case decided during the survey period construed rule
803(6), although several courts, including the Texas Supreme Court, con-
strued its statutory forerunner. These cases may nevertheless be instructive
regarding questions of interpretation of rule 803(6) in that the rule does not
appear to change prior Texas practice.
In LaFreniere v. Fitzgerald' I the Texas Supreme Court held that cancelled
checks and invoices representing payments were properly admitted under
the business records exception to the hearsay rule.' 2 The exhibits consisted
of over 550 cancelled checks supported by invoices. LaFreniere signed all
but six of the checks, the remaining six having been signed by his book-
keeper pursuant to his instructions. LaFreniere was the sole stockholder
and manager of his corporation, and each check was drawn on either his
personal account or his corporate account. He testified that each check was
issued in the regular course of his business, at or about the time of the rendi-
tion of the services paid for by the check, and that the checks were kept in
the regular course of his business. In reversing the court of appeals, the
supreme court held that the trial court properly admitted the invoices and
checks as business records pursuant to article 3737e.' 3 The supreme court
wrote that LaFreniere's testimony met the personal knowledge requirement
of article 3737e, section l(b).' 4 Texas Rule of Evidence 803(b) preserves the
personal knowledge requirement of article 3737e.15
While providing for the introduction of summaries into evidence,' 6 the
admitted without objection. See Aquamarine Assocs. v. Burton Shipyard, 659 S.W.2d 820,
822 (Tex. 1983).
8. 667 S.W.2d at 273.
9. TEX. R. EvID. 803(6). The new practice of qualifying business records remains sub-
stantially the same as the procedure under former TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3737(e)
(Vernon Supp. 1985) (repealed 1983).
10. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3737e (Vernon Supp. 1985). Article 3737e was re-
pealed in 1983 in conjunction with the adoption of the Texas Rules of Evidence.
11. 669 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. 1984).
12. Id. at 119.
13. Id.; TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3737e (Vernon Supp. 1985) (repealed 1983).
14. 669 S.W.2d at 119; TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3737e, § l(b) (Vernon Supp.
1985) (repealed 1983).
15. TEX. R. EvID. 803(6) allows admission of the records of regularly conducted activities
as an exception to the hearsay rule when certain prerequisites are "shown by the testimony of
the custodian or other qualified witness .... " Id. This requirement preserves the require-
ment of art. 3737e, § 2 that allowed the mode of preparation of the memorandum or record to
be proved by "the custodian or other qualified witness." TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
3737e, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1985) (repealed 1983).
16. TEx. R. EvID. 1006 provides that the contents of voluminous writings, recordings, or
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Texas Rules of Evidence do not contain a specific provision regarding the
admission of summaries of records of regularly conducted activities. Practi-
tioners, therefore, should assume that the method of introducing summaries
of business records probably will not change from prior Texas practice.
During the survey period the Houston court of appeals held that a business
document is admissible as a business record even though it represents a com-
pilation of prior information in Marquis Construction Co. v. Johnson Ma-
sonry. 17 Marquis considered whether invoices supporting the plaintiff's claim
for labor and materials were business records or summaries of business
records. The court wrote that there is a natural hierarchy of records in any
business, citing as examples calendar notations or phone message slips that
are later incorporated into regular business reports, which in turn subse-
quently may be incorporated into billing statements to clients.' 8 Writing
that each level of entry is a summary and a consolidation of prior notations,
the court held that each level is nevertheless a business record, made in regu-
lar course, by a person with personal knowledge, at or near time of the time
of the act, event, or condition or reasonably soon thereafter. 19 The court
ruled that an invoice, which is itself a business record, should not be treated
as a summary and is admissible if it otherwise meets the tests of article
3737e. 20
C. Excited Utterances
Another well-recognized exception to the hearsay rule is the exception for
statements made while in the grip of violent emotion, excitement, or pain. 21
The rationale for this exception is that a person in an excited condition loses
his capacity for the reflection necessary to fabricate a falsehood.22 The ex-
cited utterance exception to the hearsay rule has been codified in Texas Rule
of Evidence 803(2).23 Prior Texas common law required independent proof
of the exciting event for the excited utterance to be admissible.24 Common
law required that corroborating evidence of the exciting event be sufficient to
support a finding that the event did occur, not merely that it could have
occurred.25 Rule 803(2) does not preserve the common law requirement of
independent proof of the exciting occurrence as a prerequisite to the admis-
photographs, otherwise admissible, which cannot be conveniently examined in court, may be
presented in the form of charts or summaries if the originals or duplicates are made available
for inspection either at a reasonable time and place, or are produced in court.
17. 665 S.W.2d 514 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ ret'd n.r.e.).
18. Id. at 515.
19. Id.
20. Id. The tests of article 3737e are substantially preserved in TEx. R. EvID. 803(6).
21. See TEX. R. EvID. 803(2).
22. See Johnson v. State, 110 Tex. Crim. 250, 251, 8 S.W.2d 127, 128 (1928) (excited
utterance in murder prosecution context).
23. TEX. R. EvID. 803(2) allows the admission of statements "relating to a startling event
or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event
or condition."
24. Truck Ins. Exch. v. Michling, 364 S.W.2d 172, 175 (Tex. 1963).
25. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Hale, 400 S.W.2d 310, 311 (Tex. 1966).
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sion of the excited utterance.26
An example of the operation of the common law excited utterance excep-
tion is contained in the Texas Supreme Court opinion in Richardson v.
Green.27 Richardson considered whether a child's statements to his mother
and his mother's husband on the child's return from a visit with his father
were admissible under the res gestae 28 exception to the hearsay rule. The
court stated that to be admissible as res gestae, a statement must be shown to
have been a spontaneous reaction to an exciting event and there must be
independent proof of the exciting event to which the statement relates. 29
The court explained that the offered statements themselves cannot be used to
prove the exciting event. 30 In holding that the offered testimony was not
admissible as res gestae, the court explained that spontaneity had not been
established, because the .alleged abuse preceded the statements by several
days, and that no independent evidence supported the hearsay statement be-
cause the physician who examined the boy the following morning found no
physical evidence of the sexual abuse alleged.31 In comparison, Atlantic Mu-
tual Insurance Co. v. Middleman3 2 held that a deceased worker's statement
that he must have hurt his leg on the job was admissible through testimony
of his widow and a co-worker when other independent evidence corrobo-
rated the injury.33
26. See TEX. R. EvID. 803(2).
27. 677 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. 1984). This case also discussed the issue of whether an out-of-
court statement offered in court through a videotape, rather than by the statement of another
witness, is hearsay. Id. at 502.
28. Originally the term res gestae was used to denote testimony that accompanied the
principally litigated fact, such as the murder, accident, or tort that was the subject of the
litigation. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 288, at 686 (E. Cleary
2d ed. 1972). Commentators and courts have criticized the use of the phrase res gestae, how-
ever, because of the vagueness and imprecision that developed as the courts broadened the
usage of the term to allow evidence of almost any spontaneous declaration. Id. at 687. A
Texas commentator has also complained of the "promiscuous use of 'the nonsense phrase res
gestae,'" and has written that the common law concept of res gestae breeds confusion, is
improper, and should be avoided. Wellborn, Article VIII: Hearsay, 20 Hous. L. REV. 477,
511 (1983) (Tex. R. Evid. Handbook) (citing E. CLEARY & J. STRONG, EVIDENCE 680 (3d ed.
1981)).
29. 677 S.W.2d at 500 (citing Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Hale, 400 S.W.2d 310,
311 (Tex. 1966); Truck Ins. Exch. v. Michling, 364 S.W.2d 172, 175 (Tex. 1963)).
30. 677 S.W.2d at 500.
31. Id.
32. 661 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ ref d n.r.e.).
33. Id. at 189. The evidence complained of was introduced for the purpose of proving
that the worker sustained an injury in the course and scope of his employment. In interpreting
the opinion of the Texas Supreme Court in Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Hale, 400
S.W.2d 310, 311 (Tex. 1966), the Middleman court explained that the supreme court did not
specifically state that the independent proof of the incident or occurrence to which the state-
ment relates must be established by direct evidence, and that the finder of fact can make a
reasonable inference from direct or circumstantial probative evidence. 661 S.W.2d at 185.
The court wrote that in this case there was a close proximity between the time the worker
arrived at the employer's premises uninjured and the time his co-worker found him rubbing his
leg, and that this timing constituted sufficient direct and circumstantial evidence of probative
value to establish where, when, and how the worker was injured. Id. The testimony consid-
ered by the court in this case would also be admissible under TEX. R. EVID. 803(3), which
admits into evidence statements regarding then existing mental, emotional, or physical condi-
tions as exceptions to the hearsay rule. Id.
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D. Then Existing Mental, Emotional or Physical Condition
A well-recognized exception to the hearsay rule admits into evidence
statements tending to show either the state of mind or the physical condition
of the declarant.34 The long line of cases carving out this common law ex-
ception to the hearsay rule is now codified in Texas Rule of Evidence 803(3),
governing the admission of statements relating to then existing mental, emo-
tional, or physical conditions. 35 During this survey period, the Houston
court of appeals construed the common law basis for this exception in
Thraillkill v. Montgomery Ward & Co. 36 At issue was the propriety of the
exclusion from evidence as hearsay appellant's testimony concerning her
conversations with her doctor regarding her need for future surgery. Appel-
lant offered the testimony as an exception to the hearsay rule, claiming that
she was not offering the statements for truth of the matters asserted, but,
rather, to show her state of mind, which was relevant to her claim of mental
anguish. 37 The trial court sustained the hearsay objections, but the court of
appeals reversed, stating that the evidence was not hearsay because it was
not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 38
E. Admissions of Party-Opponents
A distinction exists between two frequently confused exceptions to the
hearsay rule: the declarations against interest exception and the admissions
of party-opponents exception. 39 Admissions of party-opponents are admissi-
ble into evidence without satisfying any of the requirements for declarations
against interest.4° Generally stated, statements of a person that are inconsis-
tent with proprietary or pecuniary interests are considered to be declarations
against interest. 41 Admissions do not need to be against the interest of the
party when made, and the party making the admission need not be unavaila-
ble.42 The Texas Rules of Evidence, while treating statements against inter-
est as exceptions to the hearsay rule, treat admissions by a party-opponent as
statements that are not hearsay. 43
34. See generally IA R. RAY, TEXAS PRACTICE, LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 831-877 (3d ed.
1980) (basis and details of exception).
35. TEX. R. EvID. 803(3).
36. 670 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
37. Id. at 386.
38. Id. In so holding, the court cited TEX. R. EvID. 801(d), which defines hearsay as a
statement offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. The court reasoned
that appellant's testimony was not offered to prove the truth of the statement asserted, but,
rather, to show appellant's state of mind. 670 S.W.2d at 386. This testimony also would be
admissible as a statement of her then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition under
TEX. R. EVID. 803(3).
39. TEX. R. EVID. 801(e)(2) defines admissions of party-opponents, and id. 803(24) de-
fines statements against interest.
40. See generally IA R. RAY, supra note 34, § 1122, at 270-73 (distinction between admis-
sions and declarations against interest).
41. Id. § 1001, at 248.
42. Id. Note that TEX. R. EvID. 803(24), governing statements against interest, makes the
admissibility of the declarant immaterial to the admission of the statement against interest.
43. TEX. R. EvID. 801(e).
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During this survey period, the Houston court of appeals considered the
hearsay exception for admissions of party-opponents in Bangor Punta Ac-
ceptance Corp. v. Palm Center R. V Sales.44 Appellant Bangor complained
of the trial court's exclusion of four cancelled checks from evidence. Palm
Center drew the four checks and sent them to Bangor as partial payment of
the promissory notes. The court of appeals reversed and held that the
checks were admissible as admissions by Palm Center of the existence of the
indebtedness that formed the basis of plaintiff's cause of action. 45 The court
explained that the statements or conduct of a party inconsistent with the
position taken by him at trial are generally admissible and that the weight
and probative force of such evidence is a matter for the trier of fact.
46
F. Judicial Admissions
A fact judicially admitted does not require evidence and establishes the
fact admitted as a matter of law, thereby precluding a trial court from find-
ing any contrary facts.4 7 The Texas Rules of Evidence, while not specifically
distinguishing judicial admissions from other admissions, treat admissions
not as exceptions to the hearsay rule but, rather, as statements that are not
hearsay. 48 Judicial admissions can be made either by a party himself or by
someone authorized to make statements on his behalf, such as his attorney.4 9
Two cases decided during the survey period held the pleading of certain facts
to be judicial admissions. Industrial Disposal Supply Co. v. Perryman Broth-
ers Trash Service5 0 and Mollinedo v. Texas Employment Commission51 held
that facts admitted in pleadings can be considered judicial admissions and
are substitutes for evidence.
Although judicial admissions preclude a trial court's finding any contrary
fact, a judicial admission is waived when evidence to the contrary is heard,
as occurred in Perryman Brothers.52 Matters deemed admitted are proper
summary judgment evidence because a party may not introduce evidence
that contradicts a judicial admission, as held by the Dallas court of appeals
44. 661 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ).
45. Id. at 240.
46. Id. The court of appeals rejected appellee's contention that the documents were busi-
ness records, and specifically ruled that no predicate was necessary under TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 3737e (Vernon Supp. 1985) (repealed 1983). 661 S.W.2d at 240. The court
explained that the items were original documents prepared by Palm Center and were admissi-
ble as admissions without regard to the business records statute. Id. at 241. The court also
rejected Palm Center's argument that the checks were hearsay, explaining that admissions by a
party-opponent are not hearsay. Id. This treatment is the same as that given admissions of
party-opponents by TEX. R. EvID. 801(e).
47. IA R. RAY, supra note 34, § 1147, at 299-300. The Texas Supreme Court established
five requirements for judicial admissions in Griffin v. Superior Ins. Co., 161 Tex. 195, 201, 338
S.W.2d 415, 419 (1960). This opinion, as well as the strong dissent by four justices, contains a
comprehensive discussion of the nuances involved in judicial admissions.
48. See TEX. R. EvID. 801(e)(2).
49. Id.
50. 664 S.W.2d 756, 763 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ ref d n.r.e.).
51. 662 S.W.2d 732, 736 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
52. 664 S.W.2d at 764.
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in Overstreet v. Home Indemnity Co. 53 The Texas Supreme Court re-
versed, 54 however, because a majority of the court, without questioning the
propriety of admissions as summary judgment evidence, believed that the
admissions did not establish plaintiff's summary judgment case as a matter
of law. 55
Two courts during the survey period held that admissions made in super-
seded pleadings lose their binding force as judicial admissions.5 6 Admissions
in abandoned pleadings, however, do have value as evidentiary admissions
and can be introduced into evidence. 57 Judicial admissions can be made in
pleadings as well as through a party's trial testimony. 58 For testimony to be
considered a judicial admission, however, the statement must be deliberate,
clear, and unequivocal. 59 Statements that are conflicting are not judicial ad-
missions, as demonstrated in Building Concepts, Inc. v. Duncan.6° To be
conclusive against a party, a judicial admission must be made in the same
proceeding or in another proceeding involving the same parties.61 During
the survey period Holloway v. Holloway62 held that a prior sworn statement
by a party in a different proceeding not involving the same parties and not
made in the same case was not a judicial admission. 63
G. Vicarious Admissions
Texas Rule of Evidence 801(e)(2)(d) reversed the much criticized holding
of Big Mac Trucking Co. v. Dickerson" that limited the category of agent or
servant admissions that are admissible against a principal. Under the new
53. 669 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984), rev'd, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 45 (Oct. 17,
1984).
54. 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 45, 46 (Oct. 17, 1984).
55. Id.
56. White v. Arco/Polymers, Inc., 720 F.2d 1391, 1396 (5th Cir. 1983); Corsi v. Nolanda
Dev. Ass'n, 674 S.W.2d 874, 878 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi), rev'd on other grounds, 682
S.W.2d 246 (Tex. 1984).
57. White v. Arco/Polymers, Inc., 720 F.2d 1391, 1396 (5th Cir. 1983); Corso v. Nolanda
Dev. Ass'n, 674 S.W.2d 874, 878 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi), rev'd on other grounds, 682
S.W.2d 246 (Tex. 1984). Admissions in abandoned pleadings are evidence that a jury is enti-
tled to consider, and the probative value of the admission against interest is a question of fact
for the jury. Although any admission in an abandoned pleading ceases to bind the pleader,
such pleading remains a statement seriously made and can be introduced into evidence as an
admission. See Valdes v. Barrera, 647 S.W.2d 377, 382 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no
writ).
58. Watts v. St. Mary's Hall, Inc., 662 S.W.2d 55, 59 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
59. Id.
60. 667 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The court
ruled that the testimony of a homeowner regarding whether changes by a contractor and plans
for construction of a residence were authorized was clearly conflicting and, therefore, could
not be considered a judicial admission. Id. at 906.
61. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Wells, 557 S.W.2d 144, 147 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1977), writ ref'd n.r.e per curiam, 566 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. 1978).
62. 671 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, writ dism'd).
63. Id. at 59.
64. 497 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. 1973). In Big Mac the Texas Supreme Court held that the
hearsay statements of an agent or employee should be admitted against a principal as vicarious
admissions only when the trial judge finds, as a preliminary fact, that the statements were
authorized. Id. at 287.
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rule, admissions of agents or employees are admissible if they are made dur-
ing the existence of an employment relationship and concern matters within
the scope of the employment relationship, even though the agent or servant
has no authority to speak.6 5 The first Texas case decided under the new rule
was Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. North American Cabinet Corp. 6 6 Yellow
Freight held that in a shipper's action against a carrier for damage to prop-
erty during transit, evidence of an oral agreement between the shipper and
the carrier, even if admitted for its truth rather than the fact of its utterance,
was admissible under rule 801(e)(2)(d) as an admission by a party's agent or
representative. 67
H. Rebutting Charges of Recent Fabrication
An exception to the hearsay rule has long admitted into evidence prior
consistent statements to support a witness charged with recent fabrication of
his testimony.6 8 The Texas Rules of Evidence do not include prior consis-
tent statements offered to rebut a charge of recent fabrication within the
definition of hearsay and admit them into evidence as statements that are not
hearsay if offered to rebut an express or implied charge of recent fabrication
or improper influence or motive.69 The Texas Supreme Court demonstrated
the operation of the common law rule in Mclnnes v. Yamaha Motor Corp.,
U.S.A. 70 In Mclnnes the supreme court ruled that the trial court erred in
excluding the testimony of a motorcyclist's daughter that the motorcyclist
had told her soon after the accident in question that his motorcycle had
forced him off the road.7 1 The court reasoned that Yamaha clearly charged
McInnes with recent fabrication and the excluded testimony would have re-
butted the charge. 7
2
I Best Evidence
No case decided during the survey period interpreted the extent to which
the common law best evidence rule has been changed by the Texas Rules of
Evidence. 73 Because of the liberal admissibility of duplicates provided by
Texas Rule of Evidence 1003, it is logical to assume that, except when ques-
tions are raised as to the authenticity of a document, a best evidence objec-
65. TEX. R. EvID. 801(e)(2)(d).
66. 670 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1984, no writ).
67. Id. at 390. Note that TEX. R. EvID. 801(e)(2)(d) does not create an exception to the
hearsay rule for admissions of a party's agents or representatives, but rather, defines them as
statements that are not hearsay.
68. Skillern & Sons, Inc. v. Rosen, 359 S.W.2d 298, 301-02 (Tex. 1962).
69. TEX. R. EvID. 801(e)(l)(B).
70. 673 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. 1984).
71. Id. at 189.
72. Id. at 190. The court ruled, however, that because the evidence excluded was cumula-
tive, the error was harmless and did not require a new trial. Id.
73. TEX. R. EvID. 1003 permits the introduction into evidence of duplicates to the same
extent as originals unless a question is raised as to their authenticity or other unfairness would
result from the admission of the duplicate. TEX. R. EvID. 1004 dispenses with the need for
originals that are lost or destroyed, not obtainable, outside the state, in the possession of the
opponent, or pertain to collateral matters.
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tion will be sustained primarily when a witness attempts to introduce oral
testimony regarding the contents of a document without introducing the
document.
Two cases decided during the survey period demonstrate the operation of
the common law best evidence rule without illuminating how Texas Rule of
Evidence 1003 has affected it. Raymond v. Aquarius Condominium Owners
Association7 4 demonstrated two ways a best evidence objection could be
overcome under the old common law rule: first, by demonstrating that the
terms of the writing not introduced were not at issue; and second, by ex-
plaining to the satisfaction of the trial court the failure to obtain the original
document.7 5 Holloway v. Holloway76 allowed the admission of a photocopy
of a check over an objection that the original had not been produced or
accounted for where the original was not available and there was no bona
fide dispute as to its being an accurate reproduction.77
J. Summaries
Texas Rule of Evidence 1006 permits the contents of voluminous writings,
recordings or photographs, otherwise admissible, to be presented in the form
of a chart, summary, or calculation. 78 This rule is basically a codification of
the prior statutory exception that allowed the admission of summaries into
evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule under former article 3737e of
the Texas Revised Civil Statutes. 79 During the survey period the Texas
Supreme Court considered the admission of summaries into evidence under
the common law rule in Aquamarine Associates v. Burton Shipyard, Inc. 80 In
Aquamarine the Texas Supreme Court affirmed the exclusion from evidence
of a summary chart offered to demonstrate plaintiff's cost of cover. The
supreme court wrote that because the underlying business records, which
were purportedly the basis of the summary chart, were not shown to be ad-
missible, the summary and any testimony regarding it were hearsay. 81
II. LAY AND EXPERT OPINION EVIDENCE
A. Texas Rules of Evidence
Some of the most significant changes wrought by the Texas Rules of Evi-
dence are contained in article VII, governing opinions and expert testimony.
Article VII allows far more liberal admission of expert and lay witness opin-
74. 662 S.W.2d 82 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ).
75. Id. at 92.
76. 671 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, writ dism'd). This case is also interesting for
its discussion of judicial admissions. See id. at 56.
77. Holloway was decided under TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3731(c) (Vernon Supp.
1982-1983), which was repealed in 1983 in conjunction with the adoption of the Texas Rules of
Evidence.
78. TEX. R. EvID. 1006.
79. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3737e was repealed in 1983, insofar as it applied to
civil actions, in conjunction with the adoption of the Texas Rules of Evidence.
80. 659 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. 1983).
81. Id. at 821-22.
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ions based on personal perceptions than did prior case law. Lay witnesses
may now state their opinions and no longer must state the specific facts on
which their opinions are based, as long as their opinions are helpful and
rationally based on perceptions.8 2 Further, Texas Rule of Evidence 704 pro-
vides that opinion testimony is not objectionable solely because it embraces
an ultimate issue to be decided by the jury.83 The facts that form the bases
of an expert's opinion may now be outside the record if they are the type of
hearsay reasonably relied upon by experts in the same field.8 4
While rule 703 defines the permissible substance of an expert's opinion,
Rule 705 defines the method for offering it. In this regard rule 705 contains
a very important change from prior Texas practice. No longer is it necessary
for an expert witness to present his opinions in answers to hypothetical ques-
tions. Rather, an expert may now state an opinion without stating its foun-
dation, leaving opposing counsel to inquire as to the bases of the opinion.8 5
The court, however, can still require the expert to state the data underlying
his opinion prior to admitting the opinion.8 6
B. Qualifications of Experts and Admissibility of Testimony
If the trier of fact would be assisted in understanding evidence or deter-
mining a fact issue by specialized knowledge, then "a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.87 An expert witness may also
draw inferences from facts in evidence that a jury is not competent to
draw.8 8 To justify the use of expert, opinion testimony, however, the Subject
of the inference or conclusion must be beyond the knowledge of the typical
layman.8 9 The witness must also have sufficient skill, knowledge, or experi-
ence within the particular field to demonstrate that he is qualified to express
an opinion. 90
The trial court has tremendous discretion in determining the admissibility
of expert testimony, and an appeals court will not disturb a trial court's
82. TEX. R. EvID. 701.
83. Id. 704.
84. Id. 703. This rule may nullify the limitation of Moore v. Grantham, 599 S.W.2d 287,
289 (Tex. 1980), that the testimony of an expert may not be based solely on hearsay. Virtually
all expert testimony is necessarily based at least partially on hearsay, and rule 703 seems to
abolish the limitation on how much hearsay an expert may consider in formulating his
opinions.
85. TEX. R. EVID. 705.
86. Id. Another important change in examination of experts is contained in id. 803(18),
the hearsay exception governing learned treatises. Learned treatises may now be proved by
one's own expert on direct examination, by other expert testimony, or by judicial notice. If
admitted, the statements may be read into evidence but may not be received as exhibits. Prior
Texas law allowed learned treatises to be used only to cross-examine an expert regarding his
opinion, not as substantive evidence. Prior case law also had required that the expert being
examined recognize the treatise as authoritative as a prerequisite to its use in cross-examina-
tion. See Bowles v. Bourdon, 148 Tex. 1, 4, 219 S.W.2d 779, 783 (Tex. 1949).
87. TEX. R. EvID. 702.





decision to admit or exclude expert testimony absent an abuse of discre-
tion.91 During the survey period, the Fort Worth court of appeals held in
Garner v. Garner92 that the court did not abuse its discretion in finding that
a case worker in a child custody proceeding was an expert in the field of
social work.93 Similarly, the Houston court of appeals held that a trial court
did not abuse its discretion by excluding testimony consisting of an officer's
opinion as to the cause of an accident in Monsanto Co. v. Johnson.94 The
action arose from an automobile accident in which a pedestrian was killed.
The court wrote that where the officer's opinion was based on interviews
with witnesses to the accident, the opinion testimony was properly excluded
because there was no showing that the officer was specifically qualified to
express his opinion because of scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge not generally possessed by a layman.95 The court explained that
the jury, which heard the direct testimony of the same witnesses to the acci-
dent, was in as good a position as the officer to form an opinion regarding
the cause of the accident.
96
C. Effect of Opinion Testimony
Several appellate courts during the survey period considered the effect of
expert opinion testimony and the extent to which either a court or a jury is
bound by the opinions of an expert. In Gonzales v. Lancaster97 the expert
opined on the cost of replacing plumbing. The court held that opinion evi-
dence does not establish any material fact as a matter of law and that a jury
could form its own opinions from other evidence admitted and by utilizing
its own experience and common knowledge. 98 By contrast, when the subject
of expert testimony is one for experts or skilled witnesses alone, and when
the jury or the court cannot properly be assumed to have formed or to be
able to form correct opinions based upon the evidence and aided by their
own experience and knowledge, expert testimony is conclusive. 99 Green v.
Crawford'O° held that expert opinions expressed by a witness, who held a
bachelor of science degree in forest management and was employed as an
independent timber resource consultant, conclusively established the value
of timber remaining after the plaintiffs had cut and removed other timber
from the subject tract. 10 1 Similarly, in Mack v. Moore,10 2 a case in which the
91. See Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299, 303-04 (Tex. 1967) (testimony of retired doctor
with no special knowledge of stapedectomy properly excluded).
92. 673 S.W.2d 413 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, writ dism'd).
93. Id. at 417.
94. 675 S.W.2d 305 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).
95. Id. at 310-11.
96. Id.
97. 675 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
98. Id. at 296.
99. Coxson v. Atlantic Life Ins. Co., 142 Tex. 544, 549, 179 S.W.2d 943, 945 (1944).
100. 662 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
101. Id. at 128.
102. 669 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ). The Mack court
held that when three expert witnesses testified that $4,865 was a reasonable value of an attor-
ney's accounting services and the client did not impeach expert witnesses on cross-examina-
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subject matter required the fact finder to be guided solely by expert opinion
and the expert opinion evidence was uncontroverted, the court held that the
failure to offer contrary expert evidence constituted an effective corrobora-
tion of the expert's testimony and, therefore, the court must accept the opin-
ion as conclusive. 10 3 During the survey period another court held that a jury
may accept or reject expert opinions or may find its own opinions from other
evidence by using its experience in matters of common knowledge. 104 Preci-
sion Homes, Inc. v. Cooper10 5 demonstrated that a jury may accept contro-
verted expert testimony as the basis of its verdict.10 6 In this homeowners'
action against a builder under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 10 7
the Houston court of appeals found an expert witness's testimony that the
foundation was not built in a workmanlike manner, although conflicting
with the contractor's testimony, sufficient to support the jury's finding that
the foundation was not built in a good, substantial, and workmanlike
manner. '
0 8
D. Testimony of Medical Experts
The trier of fact usually determines the issue of causation, even when ex-
pert testimony demonstrates probable cause. 109 The burden of proof in a
medical malpractice case is on the patient to prove that the physician has
undertaken a mode or form of treatment that a reasonable and prudent doc-
tor would not have undertaken under same or similar circumstances.°10 Ex-
pert testimony is required to meet this burden of proof. The form of offering
such expert testimony was considered by the Corpus Christi court of appeals
in Bauer v. King. " ' I In Bauer the court reversed the trial court and held that
no evidence supported a finding that the doctor's treatment fell below the
standard of care used by radiologists. 1 2 The court wrote that the medical
standard of care must be established so that the trier of fact may determine
whether the doctor's acts or omissions deviated from the standard." l3 An
expert witness in a medical malpractice case should first state what the stan-
tion, the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the evidence was that $4,865 was the
reasonable value of services rendered, and that to award less was reversible error. Id. at 319.
The Houston court of appeals made an identical holding in City of Houston v. Blackbird, 658
S.W.2d 269, 271 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ).
103. 669 S.W.2d at 319.
104. Leiber v. Texas Mun. Power Agency, 667 S.W.2d 206, 208 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (evidence sufficient to support jury's findings of after-taking
value of easement and remainder, when findings of after-taking value were above lowest figure
testified to by experts and amount of total damages found by jury was within the range of
expert testimony produced at trial).
105. 671 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
106. Id. at 929.
107. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
108. 671 S.W.2d at 929.
109. Lenger v. Physician's Gen. Hosp., Inc., 455 S.W.2d 703, 706 (Tex. 1970) (doctor testi-
fied as to possible causes for separation of sutures of mesentery).
110. Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160, 165 (Tex. 1977).
111. 674 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ granted).
112. Id. at 381.
113. Id. at 380.
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dard of care is for a specific treatment, and then state facts that establish the
nature of the defendant doctor's treatment.' 1 4 Once the standard is stated
and the facts described, the jury can then determine whether the defendant
doctor met the required standard of care." 5 Although admissibility of med-
ical testimony becomes increasingly more liberal and less dependent upon
magic words, this holding continues the long standing method for the intro-
duction of expert opinions in medical malpractice cases. 116 The Texas
Supreme Court granted writ of error in this case to consider whether the
court of appeals erred in holding there was no evidence of negligence." 17
The Houston court of appeals continued the erosion of the standard of
care distinctions between specialties and between physicians in various geo-
graphical areas. In Johnson v. Hermann Hospital"8 the court held that it
was error to exclude the expert testimony of a nurse who was qualified by
her experience in an intensive care unit to testify as a medical expert,
notwithstanding that she was not a registered nurse at the time she testi-
fied. 119 The court reversed the trial court's exclusion of the nurse's testimony
even though no certification or specialization was required for nurses to
work as critical care nurses in intensive care units, and notwithstanding that
the nurse was familiar only with the standard of care at one other hospi-
tal. 120 In reversing, the court explained that nonphysicians may qualify as
medical experts by virtue of their special experience, and that even doctors
are not required to be from the same city, state, or school of practice to
testify as medical experts so long as they are equally familiar with the subject
of the inquiry. 121
In Oil Country Haulers, Inc. v. Griffin122 the Houston court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's admission into evidence of testimony of a physician
qualified as an expert. The physician testified as to the reasonableness and
necessity of charges to the plaintiff for medical services, even though most of
the charges were not his. 123 The court held that because the physician was
qualified to testify as a medical expert, he was able to testify about the cost of
medical services. 124
E. Opinion on Ultimate Issue
Texas Rule of Evidence 704 provides that testimony otherwise admissible
is not objectionable simply because it embraces an ultimate issue to be de-
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See Snow v. Bond, 438 S.W.2d 549, 551 (Tex. 1969); Burks v. Meredith, 546 S.W.2d
366, 370 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
117. 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 53 (Oct. 24, 1984).
118. 659 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, writ refd n.r.e.).
119. Id. at 126.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. 668 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).




cided by the trier of fact. 125 No case decided during the survey period inter-
preted the extent to which this rule has modified prior Texas practice. Prior
to rule 704, objections that opinion testimony embraced an ultimate issue of
fact were sustained because such testimony historically was thought to be an
invasion of the province of the jury. 126 Texas courts will have to resolve
whether under rule 704 an expert may boldly state his opinion regarding an
ultimate fact, or whether expert testimony that simply embraces an ultimate
issue is not objectionable. The only case decided during the survey period
considering the testimony of an expert regarding an ultimate issue was de-
cided under Texas common law. In Herrera v. FMC Corp. 127 the Houston
court of appeals explained that a trial court has broad discretion in deciding
whether expert testimony that regards an ultimate fact issue is admissible. 128
The court affirmed the trial court's exclusion of testimony by the plaintiff's
expert that the defendant's failure to provide adequate warning exposed the
plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of harm. 129
F Lay Opinions
1. Owner's Opinion of Value
As noted above, the Texas Rules of Evidence have greatly liberalized the
admission of opinion testimony by lay witnesses. 130 Texas case law has al-
ways been liberal, however, in allowing an owner of property to testify as to
his opinion of its value.' 3' An owner of property can give such testimony
even though he would not be qualified to testify as an expert regarding the
value of the same property if it were owned by another person. 132
Several Texas courts during the survey period allowed owners to testify as
to value. Courts admitted owner testimony as to the value of an automobile
before and after the subject collision, 133 by the buyer of a truck regarding the
value of the truck to him when he purchased it and after the truck col-
lapsed, 134 and as to the value of gemstones lost in a burglary. 135 An owner's
testimony regarding value is subject to some restrictions, however, as evi-
125. TEX. R. EvID. 704.
126. See Loper v. Andrews, 404 S.W.2d 300, 305 (Tex. 1966) (dictum admonishing that a
witness "is not permitted to express an opinion since this invades province of the trier of the
facts").
127. 672 S.W.2d 5 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).
128. Id. at 7.
129. Id.
130. TEX. R. EvID. 701.
131. Classified Parking Sys. v. Kirby, 507 S.W.2d 586, 588 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1974, no writ) (owner of car stolen from parking garage was competent to testify
as to car's value).
132. Id.
133. Bower v. Processor & Chem. Serv., 672 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1984, no writ).
134. Superior Trucks, Inc. v. Allen, 664 S.W.2d 136, 146 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.]
1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
135. Southwest Craft Center v. Heilner, 670 S.W.2d 651, 654 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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denced in the Texas Supreme Court opinion of Porras v. Craig.136 Porras
was a suit for title and damages to land. Upon purchasing a tract of land
adjacent to Craig's tract, Porras bulldozed everything that his survey
showed to be his property, including an existing fence and two acres on
Craig's side of the fence. Porras then built a new fence on the survey line.
In so doing, Porras cut down a number of trees, some as much as four feet in
diameter. Craig filed suit for title and damages to the land on his side of the
old fence.1 37 In holding that there was no evidence to support the award of
actual damages to the land, the Texas Supreme Court explained that in order
for a property owner to qualify as a witness to the damages to his property,
his testimony must refer to market value, rather than intrinsic or some other
value of the property. 38
Another limitation on owner testimony was demonstrated in Perry v.
Texas Municipal Power Agency. 139 Perry involved an eminent domain pro-
ceeding in which a landowner who was not qualified as an expert attempted
to testify as to the amount and value of lignite on his property. The Houston
court of appeals held that such testimony was properly excluded when the
owner admitted that he was not an expert witness and his testimony was
offered as such.14°
2. Lay Testimony to Prove Medical Causation
In Morgan v. Compugraphic Corp. 41 the Texas Supreme Court held that
lay testimony is adequate to prove causation in those cases in which general
experience and common sense enable a layman to determine, with reason-
able probability, the causal relationship between the event and the condi-
tion. 142 The supreme court explained that lay testimony establishing a
sequence of events providing a "strong, logically traceable connection be-
tween the event and the condition is sufficient proof of causation."'' 43 The
lay testimony found to be sufficient in this case was plaintiff's testimony that
she had always been in good health, but that upon the installation of a type-
setting machine near her desk, positioned in such a way that its back was
only two inches from her face as she worked, she began to develop problems
with her breathing, blurred vision, headaches, stomach problems, and swell-
ing of the eyes, lips, and nasal passages. 44 Similarly, in Popkowski v.
Gramza145 the Houston court of appeals held that a personal injury plain-
136. 675 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1984).
137. The jury found that Craig had title to the land in question by virtue of adverse posses-
sion, and this finding was not in dispute before the supreme court. Id. at 504.
138. Id. at 506. The court was not unanimous in its interpretation of Craig's testimony. A
dissent by Justice Wallace, in which Justice Kilgarlin joined, stated that when Craig's testi-
mony was considered in its entirety "one is lead [sic] to the obvious conclusion that the values
being discussed are market values." Id. at 507.
139. 667 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
140. Id. at 265.
141. 675 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. 1984).
142. Id. at 733.
143. Id.
144. Plaintiff's testimony is more fully described at id. at 731.
145. 671 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1984, no writ).
1985]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
tiff's testimony concerning his physical condition following an accident was
competent evidence of his freedom from injury before the accident. 4 6
III. PAROL EVIDENCE
The parol evidence rule proscribes the use of extrinsic evidence to inter-
pret a writing. The court may allow extrinsic evidence only if it finds a
contract to be ambiguous. 147 The rule also prohibits parol evidence if a con-
tract is integrated. 48 During this survey period, several appellate courts,
including the Texas Supreme Court, rejected attempts to introduce parol
evidence on varied and ingenious grounds. In Lehman v. Corpus Christi Na-
tional Bank 49 the Texas Supreme Court affirmed the exclusion of the testi-
mony of an attorney who had prepared a will. The attorney would have
testified that in his opinion the testator did not intend to include adopted
adults within the class of descendants referenced in the will. The supreme
court held that the testimony was properly excluded not only because the
will was unambiguous, but also because the witness should not be allowed to
testify to the state of mind of another person.' 5 0 In Akin v. Dahl'5' the
Texas Supreme Court disallowed extrinsic parol evidence that would have
shown a condition that varied the terms of a written note that was unambig-
uous on its face. 152
During the survey period, the Texas courts of appeals refused to allow
parol evidence of the intent of contracting parties where a contract was un-
ambiguous,153 refused to allow parol evidence to supply the essential ele-
ments of a contract for the sale of real estate,' 54 held that no ambiguity
existed in either the term "option to purchase" or the mistaken attachment
of the wrong contract for sale when a different contract for sale was to be
incorporated by reference into the challenged contract. 55 When neither de-
fendant contended a note was not a complete and accurate integration of the
agreement between the parties, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the exclusion of parol evidence of antecedent understandings or negotiations
sought to be admitted for the purposes of varying the terms of an unambigu-
146. Id. at 919.
147. See Sun Oil Co. v. Madeley, 626 S.W.2d 726, 732 (Tex. 1981) (construction of unam-
biguous oil and gas lease).
148. Integration is the practice of embodying a transaction in a final written agreement that
is intended to incorporate in its terms the entire transaction. See 2 R. RAY, supra note 34,
§ 1602, at 312-14.
149. 668 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1984).
150. Id. at 689.
151. 661 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. 1983).
152. Id. at 916.
153. Travis Heights Improvement Ass'n v. Small, 662 S.W.2d 406, 411 (Tex. App.-Aus-
tin 1983, no writ).
154. Mainland Sav. Ass'n v. Hoffbrau Steakhouse, Inc., 659 S.W.2d 101, 103 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no writ) (because contracts for the sale of real estate fall within the
statute of frauds and must be in writing to be enforceable, it was not proper to admit oral
testimony to supply essential terms such as location or description of land).
155. Maxwell v. Lake, 674 S.W.2d 795, 801-02 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ) (con-
tract ambiguous if court is genuinely uncertain as to which one of two meanings is correct).
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ous note.156 Several appellate courts during the survey period approved pa-
rol evidence under varying circumstances. For example, courts allowed
parol evidence to show a want or failure of consideration, 157 to show misrep-
resentations under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 158 to show
fraud in the inducement, 159 and to explain the terms of a letter agreement
found to be ambiguous. 160
IV. JUDICIAL NOTICE
Judicial notice is now governed by article II of the Texas Rules of Evi-
dence. Texas Rule of Evidence 201, governing judicial notice of adjudicative
facts, is a verbatim adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 201 and basically
does not alter existing Texas practice. Texas Rule of Evidence 201 defines
the facts of which a court may properly take judicial notice. 161 The rule also
prescribes when the taking of judicial notice is discretionary or mandatory,
the timing of taking of judicial notice, and the accompanying instructions to
the jury.162 Other rules in article II govern the determination of the laws of
other states 163 and of foreign countries. 164 During the survey period, the
Texas appellate courts approved the taking of judicial notice of a court's own
record in the same case165 and of the law of another state.
166
Texas Rule of Evidence 201(f) provides that judicial notice may be taken
at any stage of the proceeding. 167 Two appellate courts during the survey
156. U.S. v. Vahlco Corp., 720 F.2d 885, 891 n.10 (5th Cir. 1983) (citing A. CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 573 (1960)).
157. DeLuca v. Munzel, 673 S.W.2d 373, 376 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (employee should be allowed to explain provision in employment contract on sum-
mary judgment).
158. Tidelands Life Ins. Co. v. Harris, 675 S.W.2d 224, 226 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (citing Anthony Indus., Inc. v. Ragsdale, 643 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth, 1983, writ refd n.r.e.).
159. Wheeler v. Box, 671 S.W.2d 75, 77 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ) (purchasers of
business brought successful DTPA action against sellers). Another fraud in the inducement
case decided during the survey period is Potts v. Potts, 672 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ) (oral promise by husband to wife that he would help her with
her income tax, when promise was allegedly made to induce wife to complete divorce, was
subject to proof by parol evidence notwithstanding that written agreement between husband
and wife stated it expressed the entire agreement between the parties).
160. Stanley v. H.J. Justin & Sons, Inc., 672 S.W.2d 327, 329 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (parol evidence was admissible to determine employment agreement was
a year-to-year contract).




165. Mitchell v. Baum, 668 S.W.2d 757, 761 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no
writ).
166. Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Morrison, 667 S.W.2d 580, 585 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1984, no writ). Note that under TEX. R. EvID. 202 the proper way of proving the law of a
foreign state is by judicial notice. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed
that the law of the foreign state is the same as that of Texas. The operation of this presump-
tion was demonstrated in another case decided during the survey period, Humphrey v. Bul-
lock, 666 S.W.2d 586, 589 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
167. TEX. R. EVID. 201(0.
1985]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
period took judicial notice on appeal. In Garza v. Garza16 8 the San Antonio
court of appeals took judicial notice that a divorce judgment was affirmed on
appeal. 169 In Haden Company v. Mixers, Inc. 170 the Dallas court of appeals
took judicial notice that a ' mark refers to feet and a " mark refers to inches
for purposes of determining whether a lien affidavit gave a meaningful de-
scription of materials furnished. 17
1
Rule 20 1(b) allows judicial notice of facts not subject to reasonable dispute
that are either generally known within the jurisdiction of the trial court or
capable of "accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned."' 172 The prior common law test,
which was substantially the same in operation but employed different lan-
guage, was whether the fact for which judicial notice was requested was ver-
ifiably certain. 173 In a pre-Texas Rules of Evidence case, the Amarillo court
of appeals in Furr's Supermarket, Inc. v. Williams174 held that the proposi-
tion that a sign purporting to mark the county line was correctly located on
the county boundary was not a certain and indisputable fact that could be
judicially noticed with verifiable certainty. 175
V. IMPEACHMENT
Several of the Texas Rules of Evidence specifically govern impeachment of
witnesses 176 and liberalize substantially the impeachment of witnesses. 177
While Texas common law permitted a witness to be impeached by a prior
conviction only if the conviction was not too remote in time to be proba-
tive, 178 rule 609(b) defines remoteness by providing that a conviction cannot
be used for impeachment if more than ten years have elapsed since the date
of the conviction or release of the witness from confinement, whichever is
later. 179 In a pre-Texas Rules of Evidence case, the Corpus Christi court of
appeals in Harker v. Coastal Engineering, Inc. 180 affirmed the trial court's
refusal to use a conviction to impeach a witness with a prior criminal convic-
tion that had occurred over ten years before his testimony.181
Rule 608(a) expands prior Texas common law by allowing the character
of a witness to be impeached or supported with opinion as well as reputation
168. 666 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ).
169. Id. at 208-09.
170. 667 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
171. Id. at 318.
172. TEX. R. EVID. 201(b)(2).
173. Eagle Trucking Co. v. Texas Bitulithic Co., 612 S.W.2d 503, 506 (Tex. 1981).
174. 664 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1983, no writ).
175. Id. at 157-58.
176. See TEX. R. EVID. 607 (who may impeach); id. 608 (evidence of character and con-
duct of witness); id. 609 (impeach by evidence of conviction of crime).
177. No impeachment case was decided during the survey period under the new rules.
178. Landry v. Travelers Ins. Co., 458 S.W.2d 649, 650-51 (Tex. 1970) (determination of
remoteness is in discretion of the trial judge weighing all the facts and circumstances).
179. TEX. R. EvID. 609(b).
180. 672 S.W.2d 517 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
181. Id. at 522.
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testimony. 182 In a personal injury action resulting from a traffic accident,
the court of appeals affirmed the exclusion of plaintiff's two convictions for
driving while intoxicated when no testimony was offered to show that plain-
tiff had a reputation for insobriety.183 In a case that clearly would have been
decided differently under rule 608(a), another appellate court affirmed the
trial court's exclusion of testimony of witnesses' opinions concerning
whether the plaintiff was a good, safe engineer because the witnesses were
asked for opinions and not about reputation.18 4 Another pre-Texas Rules of
Evidence case, demonstrating the extent to which rule 608(b) has codified
prior common law, held that inquiry into specific acts of misconduct for
impeachment is not admissible for impeachment purposes unless the specific
act involved a conviction for a crime. 185
VI. PRIVILEGES
Article V of the Texas Rules of Evidence governs privileges. The article
creates no new privileges and recognizes privileges only as created under the
rules.18 6 Two cases decided during the survey period interpreted rule 510,
which provides for the confidentiality of mental health information.18 7
Gaynier v. Johnson 88 held that a pleading of fraud does not necessarily put
mental condition into issue such as would enable an opposing party to de-
pose a psychiatrist concerning privileged communications.18 9 The court also
held that when the patient did not testify in her deposition as to what she
told her psychiatrist and did not demonstrate an intent to relinquish the
confidential communications, her testimony that she had been treated by a
psychiatrist, had been hospitalized, and had received shock treatment was
not sufficient to waive the privilege under rule 510.190
Another case strictly construing rule 510 was Ginsberg v. Johnson.191
Ginsberg is significant not only for its ruling that the medical records of
plaintiff's deceased psychiatrist were inadmissible under rule 510, but also
because the Dallas court of appeals considered the effect of an erroneous
order of production of psychiatric records by the trial court. The court held
that despite defendants' possession of the psychiatric records as a result of a
prior erroneous court order of production, and despite the claim that the
records contained evidence favorable to the defendants, the privilege had not
182. TEX. R. EvID. 608(a). Id. 405 allows the character of a witness to be proved with
opinion or reputation testimony.
183. Amoco Chem. Corp. v. Stafford, 663 S.W.2d 147, 148-49 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1983, no writ) (citing Compton v. Jay, 389 S.W.2d 639, 642-43 (Tex. 1965)).
184. Port Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Sims, 671 S.W.2d 575, 579 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (citing Eichel v. New York Cent. R.R., 375 U.S. 253 (1963)).
185. Boiling v. Baker, 671 S.W.2d 559, 569 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, writ dism'd).
186. See TEX. R. EvID. art. V.
187. TEX. R. EvID. 510.
188. 673 S.W.2d 899 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
189. Id. at 906.
190. Id. at 905-07.
191. 673 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
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been waived. 192 Although the Ginsberg court based its holding on rule 510,
the holding also casts light on the operation of rule 512, which provides that
a claim of privilege is not defeated by a disclosure that was compelled
erroneously. 193
During the survey period the Corpus Christi court of appeals considered
the parameters of the attorney-client privilege. Duke v. Power Electric &
Hardware Co. 194 held that the asking and answering of a deposition question
establishing the motive or intent of a party acting on advice of counsel was
not the type of question that would result in a waiver of the attorney-client
privilege. 195
VII. ADMISSIBILITY
Texas Rule of Evidence 403 provides that, "[a]lthough relevant, evidence
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or
by considerations of undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evi-
dence."' 196 In a pre-Texas Rules of Evidence case, the Fort Worth court of
appeals in Farmers Texas County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Jones197 held that
evidence of other insurance on the subject property at the time of a fire loss
was properly excluded in an insured's action on a fire insurance policy where
pro rata clauses in both policies provided that each company would only pay
a portion of the loss. The court explained the evidence was highly prejudi-
cial to the insured in that it focused the mind of the jury on a potential for
double recovery when in fact none existed. 198
Although it is well-settled that an offer to compromise or settle an existing
controversy is inadmissible, 99 determining what constitutes an offer of com-
promise is sometimes difficult. This difficulty was evidenced in Duval
County Ranch Co. v. Alamo Lumber Co.200 Duval County Ranch considered
a telegram that did not offer to reduce a claim but rather stated that if pay-
ment on Duval's insurance policy was further withheld, Duval would file
suit for tortious business interference. Holding that the trial court could
have considered the telegram an ultimatum rather than an overture for
peaceful settlement, the Amarillo court of appeals held that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in admitting the telegram into evidence. 20'
When a party offers into evidence a document written in a foreign lan-
192. Id. at 943.
193. TEX. R. EVID. 512.
194. 674 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).
195. Id. at 404.
196. TEX. R. EvID. 403. This list omits an important ground for exclusion of relevant
evidence previously recognized in Texas: unfair surprise to an opponent. See 2 R. RAY, supra
note 34, § 1481, at 168. Presumably, a court will have to rectify unfair surprise by either
recess or continuance.
197. 660 S.W.2d 879 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, no writ).
198. Id. at 882.
199. TEX. R. EvID. 408.
200. 663 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1983, writ refd n.r.e.).
201. Id. at 634.
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guage, the offering party bears the burden of having the document translated
into English. 20 2 In an interesting application of this old and rarely used rule
of admissibility, the Houston court of appeals in Gendebien v. Gendebien20 3
held that the trial court did not commit error by refusing to admit into evi-
dence a prenuptial agreement written in French and offered without an ac-
companying English translation. 204  Appellant's counsel argued that she
herself would have translated the document at the hearing on the motion for
new trial, but because appellant failed to develop any bill of exception dem-
onstrating what the translation would have been, the court held that appel-
lant waived any right to claim error because of the exclusion. 205
In a suit brought by a lessor to recover damages for a leased gas compres-
sor destroyed by fire, the Austin court of appeals affirmed the admissibility
of testimony and evidence concerning a prior lease agreement for another
gas compressor in PGP Gas Products, Inc. v. Reserve Equipment, Inc. 206 The
court wrote that the prior lease agreement was admissible to show that the
lessee agreed to procure insurance for the compressor in question. 20 7 The
court further explained that the existence of an oral contract that is the sub-
ject of a suit may be proved by circumstantial as well as direct evidence. 208
VIII. PRESUMPTIONS AND INFERENCES
Article III of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs presumptions. Be-
cause the Texas Rules of Evidence contain no article III, presumptions con-
tinue to be governed by Texas common law.
Presumptions and inferences, though frequently confused, are sometimes
merely assumptions of facts that have not been rebutted. 20 9 In Tanner v.
BDK Production Co.210 the Corpus Christi court of appeals reaffirmed the
black letter rule that prohibits the stacking of one presumption upon an-
other. After reviewing all testimony favorable to plaintiff, the court con-
cluded that no evidence existed tending to show that loss of circulation in
the circulating mud on an oil drilling rig posed a dangerous condition that
necessitated a duty to warn the deceased. 21 ' Assuming arguendo that one of
the defendants was negligent in his failure to warn the deceased, the court
explained that appellants failed to prove that this failure to warn of the pres-
ence of substances in the mud was the proximate cause of the fatal acci-
dent.212 The court explained that the evidence showed at most only a
possibility that the system may have been blocked and the possibility that
202. Sartor v. Bolinger, 59 Tex. 411, 413 (1883); Lacoma v. Canto, 236 S.W. 1013, 1014
(Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1922, no writ).
203. 668 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).
204. Id. at 908.
205. Id.
206. 667 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
207. Id. at 607.
208. Id.
209. See generally 1 R. RAY, supra note 34, §§ 51-56 (classification of presumptions).





the cause of the blockage was the presence of materials in the mud.2 13 From
these two possibilities, the jury would have had to draw the further inference
that there was a blockage caused by the loss of circulation caused by materi-
als in the system, which caused the end of the hose to fly up and hit the
deceased in the head. To reach this point, the court wrote that the jury
would have had to stack one inference upon another, which is not allowed
by law.2 14
A general presumption exists that in the absence of evidence to the con-
trary, a public official has properly performed his duty.2 15 Texas courts,
however, have held that the recording statutes governing judgment liens2 16
require that the proponent of the abstract of judgment produce evidence that
it was properly indexed.2 17 In Alkas v. United Savings Association of Texas,
Inc.218 the Corpus Christi court of appeals held that the common law pre-
sumption that a public official has properly performed his duty is not applied
to the indexing of judgment liens because of the statutory requirement of
proof of indexing. 2 19
IX. THE DEAD MAN'S STATUTE
Texas Rule of Evidence 601(b) abrogates the dead man's statute,220 by
permitting testimony regarding transactions with the deceased, except for
prohibiting uncorroborated oral statements by the testator in actions by or
against executors, administrators, or guardians. 221 In the only dead man's
statute case decided during the survey period, the court in Jordan v.
Shields222 noted that the Texas Rules of Evidence were not in effect at the
time of trial. The court held that in a wrongful death action arising out of a
multiple vehicular collision, the causes of action of the deceased driver's
daughter and husband were in the survivors' own right.223 Evidence con-
cerning their relationship with the deceased, therefore, did not violate the
now-repealed dead man's statute.224
X. LACK OF PROBATIVE EVIDENCE AND INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
Numerous appellate cases each year address the issue of whether any evi-
dence or sufficient evidence in the record supports the determinations of the
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See Cooper v. Hall, 489 S.W.2d 409, 416 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1972, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (clerk presumed to have mailed notice properly).
216. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 52.003, .004, .006 (Vernon 1984).
217. See Houston Inv. Bankers Corp. v. First City Bank, 640 S.W.2d 660, 662 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, no writ).
218. 672 S.W.2d 852 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
219. Id. at 859.
220. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3716 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (repealed 1983).
221. TEX. R. EvID. 601(b).
222. 674 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1984, no writ).




trier of fact.225 In deciding a no evidence point, an appellate court must
consider only the evidence and inferences tending to support the trial court's
findings and disregard all contrary evidence and inferences.226 During the
survey period, the Texas Supreme Court rendered two examples of the oper-
ation of this standard of review. In Tomlison v. Jones227 the Texas Supreme
Court applied the no evidence standard of review and held that there was
evidence to support a finding that the deceased lacked mental capacity to
change the beneficiary of his two insurance policies shortly before his
death. 228 The supreme court found some evidence to support the jury's find-
ing of no capacity, 229 and wrote that the deceased's medical records, which
were properly admitted into evidence at trial, "paint[ed] a grim picture of a
man critically injured and in great pain, at times heavily drugged, at times
hallucinating, with little possibility of survival." 230 The court wrote that
these entries in the medical records, coupled with the deceased's physician's
notation that the patient "continued his downhill course," constituted some
evidence of physical problems consistent with mental incapacity.23I
In Lucas v. Texas Industries232 the Texas Supreme Court, again employ-
ing the no evidence standard of review, reversed and remanded for determi-
nation of factual sufficiency a portion of the judgment against plaintiff.233
The court addressed the testimony of the president of one of the defendant
corporations. The president's testimony indicated that the defendant had
knowledge of plans and specifications, and that despite this knowledge, the
defendant's representative improperly advised that certain equipment would
be needed. The court wrote that the jury was entitled to conclude that the
incorrect advice concerning the equipment needed was a breach of the duty
owed to inform the plaintiff's employer correctly what equipment would be
needed to perform the lifting tasks in question. 234
In Mitsubishi Aircraft International, Inc. v. Maurer,235 in finding no evi-
dence to support a judgment for Maurer, the Dallas court of appeals not
only reversed, but rendered judgment for Mitsubishi. The court explained
that if a no evidence point is sustained and the proper procedural steps have
been taken, the finding under attack may be disregarded entirely and judg-
ment rendered for the appellant, unless the interests of justice require an-
other trial.236 In Porras v. Craig2 3 7 the Texas Supreme Court further
225. For an excellent discussion of this general area of the law, see Calvert, "No Evidence"
and "Insufficient Evidence" Points of Error, 38 TEX. L. REV. 361 (1960).
226. Glover v. Texas Gen. Indem. Co., 619 S.W.2d 400, 401 (Tex. 1981); Garza v. Alviar,
395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1965).
227. 677 S.W.2d 490 (Tex. 1984).
228. Id. at 492.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. (citing Croucher v. Croucher, 660 S.W.2d 55, 57 (Tex. 1983)).
232. 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 491 (July 11, 1984).
233. Id. at 494.
234. Id.
235. 675 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
236. Id. at 288 (citing Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1965)).
237. 675 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1984).
1985]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
explained when, given a no evidence finding, the interests of justice require
another trial. The court held that although there was no evidence of a re-
duction in market value resulting from defendant's cutting down shade or
ornamental trees on plaintiff's property, courts are authorized to award
damages for the intrinsic value of the trees. 238 Explaining that the Texas
Supreme Court had never addressed the intrinsic value rule, but noting that
a number of courts of appeals have adopted it, the supreme court stated that
in its opinion the rule is sound.239 Accordingly, the court remanded the case
for retrial so that plaintiff Craig could either show that the market value of
his land was reduced or prove damages by the intrinsic value measure. 240
When an appellate court confronts a challenge that the evidence is merely
insufficient, it must consider and weigh all the evidence in a case, including
that which is contrary to the judgment. 241 The court must decide if the
evidence that supports the judgment is so weak, or the evidence to the con-
trary is so overwhelming, as to warrant setting aside the judgment and re-
manding for a new trial.24 2 One court, applying this standard of review,
found evidence to be legally sufficient to support a jury finding that an entire
sixty-four-acre tract owned by a church and used as a church camp site was
an actual place of worship, thereby qualifying for ad valorem tax exemp-
tion.243 The Fort Worth court of appeals also applied this standard of re-
view and found that in a breach of contract suit against a roofer who had
agreed to cover a swimming pool during roofing repairs, but failed to do so,
evidence was sufficient to support the conclusion that the black substance
later found on the swimming pool was tar, and that the roofer was responsi-
ble for its being in the pool. 244
238. Id. at 506.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Burnett v. Motyka, 610 S.W.2d 735, 736 (Tex. 1980) (citing In re King's Estate, 150
Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1952)).
242. See Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1965); Calvert, supra note 225.
243. Kerrville Indep. School Dist. v. Southwest Texas Encampment Ass'n, 673 S.W.2d
256, 260 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
244. Hollingsworth Roofing Co. v. Morrison, 668 S.W.2d 872, 874-75 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1984, no writ).
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